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3.3.1. Why do we Need Algebraic Immunity?
The benefits we enjoy from the internet depend critically on our ability
to communicate securely. For example, to bank online we depend
on the encoding of plaintext messages (our personal identifications
numbers, for instance), which, if divulged, could result in significant
loss of personal funds. Unfortunately, the theft of credit/debit card
numbers is one of the most common crimes in the internet age. Such
a theft is especially enticing since the individual committing the theft
is likely to be far away from the victim, therefore feeling immune to
prosecution.
Encryption is a process of converting a plaintext (cleartext) message
into a scrambled message, called ciphertext. With the internet as
is typically configured now, actual interception of a message is easy;
anyone with access to a server and some programming skills can easily
acquire the communication. However, in the case of an encrypted
message, it is necessary to then decrypt the message, and in so doing
extract the original plaintext message. The present benefits of the
internet depend critically on the degree of difficulty associated with
the discovery of the plaintext message.
For example, one could encrypt a message by exclusive ORing a code
(the same code) on each ASCII character in the message. In this case,
`A' is always transformed into some other letter, like `K', `B' is always
transformed to say `T', etc. Breaking such a code is easy, by using
statistical analysis, since one can guess that the most common letter
represents an `E', while a rare letter represents a `Z'. Although the
guess may be wrong, with enough computing power and enough of
the encrypted message, a dedicated thief would eventually succeed.
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Present day encryption algorithms are significantly more sophisticated
than this simple example. However, in addition to much better en-
cryption algorithms, there has also been a significant increase in com-
puting power. Indeed, we live in an era of the supercomputer on the
desk, in which thousands of processors exist within the space that
recently housed only one processor. Therefore, there is an enhanced
ability to try out many guesses and to analyze huge quantities of ci-
phertext.
An attempt to decipher a message is called a (cryptographic) attack, or
cryptanalysis. An attack is often predicated on a perceived weakness
in the encoding algorithm. For example, one of the earliest attacks,
called the linear attack, is most successful when the encoding algo-
rithm uses a not too complicated approximation of a linear (or affine)
Boolean function. A linear (affine) function is the exclusive OR of lin-
ear terms only (or their complement). For example, f1 = x1⊕x3⊕x4 is
a linear function (both f1 and f1⊕1 are affine), while f2 = x1x2⊕x3x4
is not linear (nor affine as it has degree two). In a linear attack, the
attacker takes advantage of an affine approximation of the action of
the cipher. If the function used in some step of the cipher is linear or
even `close to linear', such an attack is likely to succeed. To mitigate
against such attacks, Boolean functions that are highly nonlinear are
used in the encryption instead. This led to interest in bent functions,
Boolean functions whose nonlinearity exceeds that of all others. For
a tutorial description of bent functions, see [147].
Since Rothaus' seminal contribution on bent functions in 1976 [226],
there has been much work on the cryptographic properties of Boolean
functions [313]. Such properties include strict avalanche criterion [138,
244], propagation criteria [12], and correlation immunity [312]. How-
ever, within the past 10 years an effective attack that uses Gaussian
elimination has emerged [222, 223].
Any stream or block cipher can be described by a system of equations
expressing the ciphertext as a function of the plaintext and the key
bits. An algebraic attack is simply an attempt to solve this system of
equations for the plaintext. If the system happens to be overdefined,
then the attacker can use linearization techniques to extract a solution.
However, in general, this approach is difficult, and not effective, unless
the equations happen to be of low degree. That is (somewhat) ensured
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if, for instance, the nonlinear Boolean function combiner in an LFSR-
based generator (a widely used encryption technique) has low degree
or the combiner has a low algebraic immunity (defined below) [222,
223].
Let be f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) a Boolean function that depends on the bits
{x1, x2, . . . , xn} of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Let be L
another function that defines the LFSR. Specifically,
L : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
defines how the values of the LFSR bits at some clock period de-
pend on the bit values in the previous clock period. Suppose the
keystream z0, z1, z2, . . . is computed from some initial secret state
(the key) given by n bits a0, a1, . . . , an−1 in the following way. Let










The problem of extracting the plaintext message in this context is
equivalent to the problem of finding the initial key a, knowing L and
f , and intercepting zi. Assume that f is expressed in its algebraic
normal form (ANF). Specifically,
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = c0 ⊕ c1x1 ⊕ c2x2 ⊕ . . . c2n−1x1x2 . . . xn ,
where ci ∈ {0, 1} is uniquely determined by c. Let deg(f) = d be the
number of variables in the term of the ANF with the largest number
of variables. Since deg(f) = d, every term on the right hand side of
any equation in the above set of equations has d or fewer variables.







or fewer of these terms, and we
define a variable yj for each one of them. If a cryptanalyst has access
to at least N ≥ M keystream bits zt, then he/she can solve the
linear system of N equations for the values of the variables yj , and
thus recover the values of a0, a1, . . . , an−1. If d is not large, then the
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cryptanalyst may well be able to acquire enough keystream bits so
that the system of linear equations is highly overdefined (that is, N
is much larger than M).
If we use Gaussian reduction to solve the linear system, then the





, where ω is the well
known exponent of Gaussian reduction (ω = 3 (Gauss-Jordan [105]);
ω = log2 7 = 2.807 (Strassen [326]); ω = 2.376 (Coppersmith-Wino-
grad [71])). For n ≥ 128 and d ∼ n, we are near the upper limits for
which this attack is practical for actual systems, since the complexity
grows with d.
Courtois and Meier [222] showed that if one can find a function g
with small degree dg such that fg = 0 or (1 ⊕ f)g = 0, then the










. We say that g is an annihilator of f . That is easy to see, since
f(Li(a)) = zi becomes g(L
i(a)) · f(Li(a)) = 0 = zi g(Li(a)), and so,
we get the equations g(Li(a)) = 0, whenever the intercepted zi 6= 0.












Therefore, it is necessary to have a fast computation of a low(est)
degree annihilator of the combiner f .
3.3.2. Why do we Need a Reconfigurable Computer?
Although the computations needed in an attack or a defense can
be done by a conventional computer, a significant speedup can be
achieved by using a reconfigurable computer. For example, it has
been shown that a reconfigurable computer can compute bent func-
tions for use in encryption at a speed that is 60,000 times faster than
by a conventional computer [146]. The speedup is achieved because
a reconfigurable computer can implement many copies of basic logic
elements, like adders and comparators, which can then execute si-
multaneously. However, in a conventional computer, there are fast
logic elements, like adders, but there are relatively few of them. A
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conventional computer is limited in what it can efficiently compute be-
cause its architecture is limited. As another example, the effectiveness
of a reconfigurable computer has been shown in computing Boolean
functions with high correlation immunity, which are more immune to
correlation immunity attacks [92]. A speedup of about 190 times was
achieved.
In this section, we show that a reconfigurable computer is effective in
computing the algebraic immunity of a Boolean function. This study
represents a departure from the two studies involving a reconfigurable
computer described above. That is, compared to nonlinearity and
correlation immunity, the computation of the algebraic immunity of a
Boolean function is more complex. Given human inclinations, it would
seem that algebraic immunity computations should be relegated to
conventional computers rather than reconfigurable computers. How-
ever, we show that his intuition is wrong; reconfigurable computers
still hold an advantage over conventional computers.
3.3.3. Background and Notation
We start with a combinatorial property of a Boolean function that
also plays an important role in the cryptographic world (see [313] for
more cryptographic properties of Boolean functions).
Definition 3.6. The degree d of a term xi1xi2 . . . xid is the number
of distinct variables in that term, where ij ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and n is
the total number of variables.
Definition 3.7. The algebraic normal form or ANF of a Boolean
function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) consists of the exclusive OR of terms; specif-
ically, f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = c0 ⊕ c1x1 ⊕ c2x2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ c2n−1x1x2 . . . xn,
where ci ∈ {0, 1}.
The ANF of a function is often referred to as the positive polarity
Reed-Muller form.
Definition 3.8. The degree, deg(f), of function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is
the largest degree among all the terms in the ANF of f .
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Table 3.2. Functions that annihilate the 3-variable majority function f
and their degree
x1x2x3 f α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 α8 α9 α10 α11 α12 α13 α14 α15
000 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
001 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
010 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
011 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
101 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
111 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Degree 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3
Example 3.1. The ANF of the 3-variable majority function is
f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3 .
Its degree is 2.
Definition 3.9. Function a 6= 0 is an annihilator of function f if
and only if a · f = 0.
Note that f¯ is an annihilator of f . Further, if a is an annihilator of f ,
so also is α, where α ≤ a ('≤' is a partial order on the set of vectors
of the same dimension, that is, (αi)i ≤ (βi)i if and only if αi ≤ βi, for
any i).
Definition 3.10. Function f has algebraic immunity k where
k = min{deg(a) | a is an annihilator of f or f¯} .
Example 3.2. The annihilators of the 3-variable majority function
f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2⊕x1x3⊕x2x3 include f¯ and all g such that g ≤ f¯ ,
excluding the constant 0 function. In all, there are 15 annihilators of
f and 15 annihilators of f¯ . Among these 30 functions, the minimum
degree is 2. Thus, f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2⊕x1x3⊕x2x3 has algebraic im-
munity 2. Table 3.2 shows all 15 annihilators (labeled α1, α2, . . . , α15)
of the 3-variable majority function. Table 3.3 shows all 15 annihilators
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Table 3.3. Functions that annihilate the complement of the 3-variable ma-
jority function
x1x2x3 f¯ β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 β9 β10 β11 β12 β13 β14 β15
000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
001 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
010 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
011 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
101 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
110 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
111 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Degree 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3
(labeled β1, β2, . . . , β15) of the complement of the 3-variable majority
function. Across both of these tables, one can verify that the minimum
degree among annihilators is 2. It follows that the algebraic immunity
of the 3-variable majority function is equal to 2.
Example 3.3. Let n = 4. The function f = x1x2x3x4 has the highest
degree, that is equal to 4. Function a = x¯1 = x1⊕1 annihilates f , since
a · f = x¯1x1x2x3x4 = 0. Since, x¯1 has degree 1 and there exists no
annihilator of f of degree 0, the algebraic immunity of f is equal to 1.
To reach this conclusion, it is not necessary to check the annihilators
of f¯ , since the only annihilator of f¯ is f , which has degree 4.
We can immediately state the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.6. The algebraic immunity of a function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
is identical to the algebraic immunity of f¯ .
Lemma 3.7. The algebraic immunity of a function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
is min{deg(α)|α ≤ f¯ or α ≤ f}.
Proof. The hypothesis follows immediately from the observation that
{α|α ≤ f¯ or α ≤ f} is the set of all annihilators of f .
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Lemma 3.7 is similar to Definition 3.10. However, there is an im-
portant difference. Lemma 3.7 admits an algorithm for determining
the algebraic immunity of a function f . Specifically, examine the de-
gree of each function α such that α ≤ f¯ and determine the minimum
degree of the ANF among all α. This requires the examination of
22
n−wt(f)− 1 functions, where wt(f) is the number of 1's in the truth
table of f , since f¯ has 2n − wt(f) 1's in its truth table. In forming an
annihilator, each 1 can be retained or set to 0. The `−1' accounts for
the case where all 1's are set to 0, which is not an annihilator. The
following result is essential to the efficient computation of algebraic
immunity.
Lemma 3.8. [222, 330] The algebraic immunity AI(f) of a function
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) is bounded above; specifically, AI(f) ≤ dn2 e.
3.3.4. Computation of Algebraic Immunity
Row Echelon Reduction Method. The computation of algebraic im-
munity is more complex than nonlinearity and correlation immunity,
two cryptographic properties that have been previously computed by
a reconfigurable computer. There are several methods for computing
the algebraic immunity of a Boolean function f . In the brute force
method, one checks every function to see if it is an annihilator of the
given f , or its complement. In another approach, one can identify
directly the annihilators with high degree. Since our attempt is to
implement the algebraic immunity computation on a reconfigurable
computer, we have not implemented the more recent algorithm of
Armchnecht et al. [94], which also deals with fast algebraic attack
issues. Our approach is based on a simpler version of that linear
algebra approach. This enabled us to implement it on the SRC-6 re-
configurable computer and to display the algebraic immunity profiles
for all functions on n variables, for 2 ≤ n ≤ 5. A similar approach has
been used to compute algebraic immunity on a conventional processor
[222, 330]. Our implementation is the first known using Verilog on an
FPGA.
Here, we create the ANF of a minterm corresponding to each 1 in the
truth table of the function. Our approach to solving this system is to
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express this in reduced row echelon form using Gaussian elimination.
It is based on two elementary row operations: (1) interchange two
rows, and (2) add one row to another row. A simple test applied to
the reduced row echelon form determines if there is an annihilator of
some specified degree.
Our approach is to express the system of linear equations in reduced
row echelon form, and, from this, determine if there exists a solution
of some specified degree. A matrix is in row echelon form if it satisfies
the following conditions:
1. the first nonzero element (leading entry) in each row is 1
2. each leading entry is in a column to the right of the leading entry
in the previous row
3. rows with all zero elements (if any) are below rows having a
nonzero element.
To put the matrix in reduced row echelon form, one simply uses elim-
ination on nonzero entries above each pivot.
Example 3.4. To illustrate, consider solving the algebraic immunity
of the majority function f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3. The top
half of Table 3.4 shows the minterm canonical form of f¯ . Here, the
first (leftmost) column represents all binary three tuples on three vari-
ables. The second column contains the truth table of the complement
function f¯ , which is expressed as x¯1x¯2x¯3 ∨ x¯1x¯2x3 ∨ x¯1x2x¯3 ∨ x1x¯2x¯3,
or more compactly, as the sum of minterms m0 ∨m1 ∨m2 ∨m4. This
represents the annihilator of f with the most 1's.
The columns are labeled by all possible terms in the ANF of an anni-
hilator. Then, 1's are inserted into the table to represent the ANF of
the minterms. For example, since the top minterm, m0 = x¯1x¯2x¯3 =
(x1⊕1)(x2⊕1)(x3⊕1) = x1x2x3⊕x2x3⊕x1x3⊕x1x2⊕x3⊕x2⊕x1⊕1,
its ANF has all possible terms, and so, there is a 1 in every column
of this row.
Note that we can obtain the ANF of some combination of minterms
as the exclusive OR of various rows in the top half of Table 3.4. This
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Table 3.4. Functions that annihilate the 3-variable majority function
ANF Coefficient → c7 c6 c5 c4 c3 c2 c1 c0 Minterms
Index x1x2x3 f¯ x1x2x3 x2x3 x1x3 x1x2 x3 x2 x1 1
Original
0 000 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 m0
1 001 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 m1
2 010 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 m2
3 011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 100 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 m4
5 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reduced Row Echelon Form
0 - - 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 m1⊕m2⊕m4
1 - - 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 m0 ⊕m4
2 - - 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 m0 ⊕m2
3 - - 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 m0 ⊕m1
4 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
follows from the observation that mi ∨ mj = mi ⊕ mj due to the
orthogonality of the minterms. For example, one annihilator a is
a = x¯1x2x¯3 ∨ x¯1x¯2x¯3 ,
and so the ANF of a is generated by simply exclusive ORing the rows
associated with these two minterms.
Elementary Row Operations. Consider a 0− 1 matrix and two row
operations:
1. interchange one row with another, and
2. replace one row by the exclusive OR of that row with any other
row.
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Using elementary row operations, we seek to create columns, starting
with the left column with only one 1 (called a pivot).
Definition 3.11. A 0−1 matrix is in row echelon form if and only
if all nonzero rows (if they exist) are above any rows of all zeroes, and
the leading coefficient (pivot) of a nonzero row is always strictly to the
right of the leading coefficient of the row above it.
Definition 3.12. [255] A 0−1 matrix is in reduced row echelon
form if and only if it is in row echelon form and each leading 1 (pivot)
is the only 1 in its column.
Consider Table 3.4. The top half shows the truth table of f¯ . For
each value 1 (minterm  m0, m1, m2, and m4) in the f¯ column (third
column), the ANF of that minterm is expressed across the rows. To
form an annihilator of f , we must combine one or more minterms using
the exclusive OR operation. The bottom half of Table 3.4 shows the
reduced row echelon form of the top half. The row operations we used
to derive the bottom half from the top half can be inferred from the
rightmost column. For instance, the entry m0 ⊕ m1 in the bottom
half of the table indicates that the rows labeled m0 and m1 in the top
half of the table were combined using the exclusive OR operation.
Note that, like the top half of Table 3.4, the rows in the reduced row
echelon form combine to form any annihilator of the original function.
This follows from the fact that any single minterm can be formed
as the exclusive OR of rows in the reduced row echelon form. For
example, m1 is obtained as the exclusive OR of the top three rows of
the reduced row echelon form.
The advantage of the reduced row echelon form is that we can simply
inspect the rows to determine the annihilators of lowest degree. For
example, in the reduced row echelon form, the top row represents an
annihilator of degree 3, since there is a value 1 in the column associated
with x1x2x3. Since the pivot point has the only value 1 in this row,
the only way to form an annihilator of degree 3 is to include this row.
The other three rows each have a pivot in a column associated with
a degree 2 term. And, the only way to have a degree 2 term is to
involve at least one of these rows. Since there are no other rows with
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a pivot point in a degree 1 or 0 term, we can conclude that there
exist no annihilators of degree 1 or 0. Thus, the lowest degree of an
annihilator of f (= x1x2 ⊕ x1x3 ⊕ x2x3) is equal to 2.
Steps to Reduce the Computation Time. The matrices for which
we seek a reduced row echelon form can be large. For example, each
matrix has 2n rows, of which we manipulate only those with 1's in
the function. Potentially, there are also 2n columns. However, we can
reduce the columns we need to examine by a few observations. Recall
that no function has an AI greater than dn2 e. Thus, we need consider
only those columns corresponding to ANF terms where there are dn2 e
or fewer variables. However, it is not necessary to consider columns
corresponding to terms with exactly dn2 e variables. This is because
if no annihilators are found for a function f (or its complement) of
degree dn2 e − 1 or less, it must have an AI of dn2 e.
We can reduce the computation of the AI of a function by another
observation. If a degree 1 annihilator for a function is found, there is
no need to analyze its complement. Even if the complement has no
annihilators of degree 1, the function itself has AI of 1. On the other
hand, finding an annihilator of degree dn2 e requires the analysis of its
complement for annihilators of smaller degree.
3.3.5. Results and Comments
Approach. A Verilog program was written to implement the row
echelon conversion process described above. It runs on an SRC-6 re-
configurable computer from SRC Computers, Inc. and uses the Xilinx
Virtex2p (Virtex2 Pro) XC2VP100 FPGA with Package FF1696 and
Speed Grade -5. Table 3.5 compares the average time in computing
the AI of an n-variable function on this FPGA with that of a typi-
cal microprocessor. In this case, we chose the IntelrCoreTM2 Duo
P8400 processor running at 2.26 GHz. This processor runs Windows
7 and has 4 GB of RAM. The code was compiled using Code::Blocks
10.05. The data shown is from a C program that also implements the
row echelon conversion process. For ease of presentation, we compute
the rate of computation, as measured by the number of functions per
second.
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Table 3.5. Comparison of the computation times for enumerating the AI
of n-variable functions on the SRC-6 reconfigurable computer
versus an Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 microprocessor
SRC-6 Reconfigurable Comp.
Clocks per Functions
n function per second # of samples Speedup
2 46.3 2,162,162 16,000,000* 0.5
3 70.7 1,414,130 25,600,000* 1.1
4 75.5 880,558 65,536,000* 1.9
5 348.4 287,012 4,294,967,296* 4.9







* Exhaustive enumeration of all n-variable functions
Computation Times. Table 3.5 compares the computation times for
AI when done on the SRC-6 reconfigurable computer and on an Intelr
CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor.
The second, third, and fourth columns in the upper part of Table 3.5
show the performance of the SRC-6 and the middle two columns in the
lower part of this table show the performance on the Intelr CoreTM2
Duo P8400 processor. The last column shows the speedup of the
SRC-6 over the Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor.
The second column shows the average number of 100 MHz clocks
needed by the SRC-6. The third column shows the average number
of functions per second. The fourth column shows the number of
functions. The term samples is used here to indicate that, for smaller
n, we had to repeat the computation of the same function to achieve
a sufficient number of functions between each measuring point so that
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Table 3.6. Comparing the brute force method with the row echelon
method on 4-variable functions
Brute Force Row Echelon
# Functions 65,536 65,536
Total Time (sec.) 0.807 0.050
Total Clocks 80,748,733 4,946,111
Clocks Per Function 1,232.1 75.5
Functions Per Second 81,160 1,325,000
the time of computation was accurate. In the case of n ≤ 5, all
functions were enumerated, and in the case of n = 6, a subset of
random functions was enumerated.
The second column in the lower part of Table 3.5 shows the average
number of functions per second on the Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400
processor, while the third column of this table shows the number of
functions. The last column shows the speedup of the reconfigurable
computer over the Intelr CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor.
For example, for n = 5, the SRC-6 reconfigurable computer is 4.9
times faster than the Intelr processor. For n = 4, the SRC-6 is 1.9
times faster. However, for n = 6, the processor is actually faster than
the reconfigurable computer. In the case of n = 6, a sample size of
25,000,000 was used for the SRC-6 and 500,000,000 for the Intelr
CoreTM2 Duo P8400 processor. For all lower values of n, exhaustive
enumeration was performed.
Comparing the Row Echelon Method to Brute Force. Table 3.6
compares the row echelon method, which involves the solution of si-
multaneous equations with the brute force method discussed earlier
for the case of n = 4.
In both cases, 65,536 functions were considered, all 4-variable func-
tions. The last row shows that the row echelon method is able to pro-
cess 1,325,000 functions per second verses 81,160 functions per second
for the brute force method, resulting in 16.3 times the throughput.
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Table 3.7. The number of n-variable functions distributed according to
algebraic immunity for 2 ≤ n ≤ 6
AI\n 2 3 4 5
0 2 2 2 2
1 14 198 10,582 7,666,550
2 0 56 54,952 4,089,535,624
3 0 0 0 197,765,120







Bold entries are previously unknown.
Bold and italicized entries are estimates to previously unknown values.
Distribution of Algebraic Immunity to Functions. Table 3.7 shows
the number of functions with various algebraic immunities for 2 ≤
n ≤ 6. This extends the results of [346] to n = 5. In our case, the use
of a reconfigurable computer allows this extension.
The entries shown in bold in the column for AI = 5 are exact values
for previously unknown values. The entries shown in bold and italics
for AI = 6 are approximate values for previously unknown values. In
this case, the approximate values were determined by a Monte Carlo
method in which 500,000,000 random 6-variable functions were gen-
erated (or 2.7 × 10−9% of the total number of functions) and their
algebraic immunity computed. For n = 5 and n = 6, the number of
functions with algebraic immunity 1 are known. However, Table 3.7
shows the value 0 for the number of functions with algebraic immunity
0 (there are actually 2, the exclusive OR function and its complement).
This is because the Monte Carlo method produced no functions with
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Table 3.8. Frequency and resources used to realize the AI computation on
the SRC-6's Xilinx Virtex2p (Virtex2 Pro) XC2VP100 FPGA
n Freqency # of Total # of # of occupied
(MHz) LUTs slice FFs slices
2 103.1 2,066( 2%) 2,977(3%) 2,089( 4%)
3 113.0 2,199( 2%) 3,011(3%) 2,157( 4%)
4 109.4 2,343( 2%) 2,760(3%) 2,120( 4%)
5 100.9 5,037( 5%) 4,110(4%) 3,780( 8%)
6 87.5 8,990(10%) 3,235(3%) 5,060(11%)
an AI of 0. The italicized value, 1,114,183,342,052, in Table 3.7 is an
estimate of the number of 6-variable functions with algebraic immu-
nity 1. To show the accuracy of the Monte Carlo method, compare
this to the previously known exact value 1,081,682,871,734 [346]. The
estimated value is 3% greater than the exact value.
Resources Used. Table 3.8 shows the frequency achieved on the
SRC-6 and the number of LUTs and flip-flops needed in the realiza-
tion of the AI computation for various n. The frequency ranges from
113.0 MHz at n = 3 to 87.5 MHz for n = 6. Since the SRC-6 runs
at 100 MHz, the 87.5 MHz value is cause for concern. However, the
system works well at this frequency. For all values of n, the number
of LUTs, slice flip-flops, and occupied slices were well within FPGA
limits. Indeed, among all three parameters and all values of n, the
highest percentage was 11%.
Cryptographic Properties. We show that a reconfigurable computer
can be programmed to efficiently compute the algebraic immunity of a
logic function. Specifically, we show a 4.9 times speedup over the com-
putation time of a conventional processor. This is encouraging given
that algebraic immunity is one of the most complex cryptographic
properties to compute. This is the third cryptographic property we
have concentrated on that has benefited from the highly efficient, par-
allel nature of the reconfigurable computer. The interested reader may
wish to consult two previous papers on nonlinearity [146] and corre-
lation immunity [92].
